Battle Of Brice's Cross Roads
Battle Of Brice's Cross Roads, Or Tishomingo
Creek, June 2nd to 12th, 1864.
By Stephen D. Lee
The campaign of Gen. Sherman, with his infantry command,
from Vicksburg to Meridian, Miss. (February 3rd to March 5th, 1864), and his
cavalry column, under Gen. William Sooy Smith, from Colliersville, Tenn., to
West Point, Miss., (February nth to February 26th, 1864), left the two cavalry
divisions of Generals S. D. Lee and N. B. Forrest much worn by excessive fatigue
in marching and fighting continuously for over a month. The close of the
campaign found Gen. Lee's division in the vicinity of Canton, Miss., resting and
recruiting, and Gen. Forrest's command in the prairie region of Northeast
Mississippi, near Okolona and Tupelo.
The great campaign in North Georgia between Gen. Sherman on the Union side and
Gen. Joseph E. Johnston or. the Confederate side was about beginning, and troops
were being sent to reinforce Gen. Johnston from Mississippi and other states of
the Confederacy. As early as April 10th, Gen. Lee was ordered with part of his
division from Canton, Miss., to Tuscaloosa, Ala., with the command of W. H.
Jackson's two brigades and of Ferguson's brigade. On April 13th, Gen. Lee was
put in command of all the cavalry in the Department of Mississippi, Alabama,
East Louisiana, and West Tennessee, including Gen. Forrest's command. On May 4,
Gen. Lee's own division was moved to Montevallo, Ala., to be nearer Gen.
Johnston's army. On the 9th day of May, Gen. Polk with two infantry divisions (Loring's
and French's), which had been assigned to the defense of Mississippi, were sent
to reinforce Gen. Johnston's army.
Gen. S. D. Lee was relieved of the personal command of his cavalry division,
which was also sent to report to Gen. Johnston, while he was ordered to relieve
Gen. Polk of the command of his department: viz., Mississippi, Alabama, East
Louisiana, and West Tennessee.
This disposition of troops took all the infantry out of the department except
the small garrison left in Mobile for its defense.
Small garrisons (mainly for post duty), cavalry and artillery, were also left at
Meridian, Miss., Selma, Ala., and a few paroled men at Enterprise, Miss., to
protect public property at those places. The cavalry consisted of the recently
organized command of Gen. Forrest in North Mississippi, only partially armed, of
Adams' brigade between Jackson and Vicksburg, Miss., of Roddey's cavalry in
North Alabama, and of Gholson's brigade of state cavalry in Mississippi. The
effective force was about 16,000 men, scattered along the river front from
Louisiana to Memphis, and along the northern frontier of Mississippi and
Alabama, from Memphis, Tenn., to Georgia. Opposed to this force of cavalry were
large garrisons of infantry and cavalry at Baton Rogue, La., Vicksburg, Miss.,
Memphis, Tenn., and in North Alabama (mainly at Decatur) making constant raids
into the interior from those localities.
As
Gen. Sherman gradually pressed Gen. Johnston's army back from Dalton, Ga.,
towards Atlanta, the railroads in Mississippi, connecting the prairie, or corn
region, with Meridian ; the railroads from Meridian through Selma and
Montgomery, Ala., to Atlanta, Ga., which mainly supplied Gen. Johnston's army in
North Georgia with provisions ; and the machinery and shops at Selma and
Montgomery, Ala., for the manufacture of ordnance, harnesses, and ammunition,
were a constant source of uneasiness to Gen. S. D. Lee and to the authorities at
Richmond, Va., for fear of raids and large expeditions from North Alabama into
the interior of the State to Selma or Montgomery.
Great pressure was brought to bear on Gen. Lee by Gen. Johnston and through Gen.
Polk to have him move all his disposable cavalry force from Mississippi into
Alabama to protect the flank of Johnston's army and the immediate source of
supplies for that army, or to virtually abandon the State of Mississippi to
raids and move into Middle Tennessee to operate on and break up the railroads
supplying Sherman's army confronting Gen. Johnston.
In response to this constant pressure, Gen. Lee (May 22nd) moved one of Gen.
Forrest's cavalry divisions under Gen. Chalmers from Tupelo, Miss., to
Montevallo, Ala., as the enemy had concentrated a force of 8,000 men at Decatur
apparently to move into Middle Alabama. This Federal force was so threatening
that on May 3ist, in response to most urgent appeals, Gen. Lee ordered Gen.
Forrest to move with his other division of cavalry from Tupelo, Miss., into
North Alabama to aid Generals Roddey and Chalmers in checking this force, as it
was reported to be moving towards Montgomery. The column, however, turned
eastward and reinforced Gen. Sherman in North Georgia.
Gen. Forrest had scarcely reached Russellville, Ala., when a large force of
8,000 men under Gen. Sturgis left the Memphis and Charleston railroad (just over
the Mississippi border) near Saulsbury, Tenn. They were headed for the prairie
region of Mississippi, and for Columbus, Miss., and Selma, Ala. This was a well
organized force intended to defeat and crush Forrest as shown by the dispatches.
Gen. Lee at once recalled Forrest from Alabama to meet this formidable invasion
of Mississippi. That energetic officer returned with only one of his divisions
and a part of Gen. Roddey 's force, leaving Gen. Chalmers still in Alabama to
protect the interior of the State and the roads and the shops.
As previously stated, in consequence of the recent expeditions of Gen. Forrest
into West Tennessee, a large Federal force was kept constantly at Memphis,
Tenn., for the purpose of threatening Mississippi. Gen. Sturgis with a large
force had followed Gen. Forrest out of Tennessee, and had pursued him as far
south as Ripley, about May 10th, returning thence to Memphis. Gen. Lee was being
pressed to send Gen. Forrest into Middle Tennessee, and had arranged to do so
about the 17th of May. The column was about starting when definite information
was acquired of a large force in Memphis, organizing to march against Forrest on
the M. & O. Railroad. This caused Gen. Lee to suspend the movement upon the
advice of Gen. Forrest. On May 22nd a large force at Decatur, Ala., threatened
the shops and railroads at Montgomery and Selma and one of Gen. Forrest's
divisions under Gen. Chalmers was sent to Montevallo, Ala., to meet any
emergency from that source.
The delay in starting the expedition from Memphis caused Gen. Forrest to believe
it was not coming; and in his telegram of May 20th (p. 628, Serial Number No. 78
Rebellion Records) he said that, "The time has arrived, if I can be spared and
allowed 2,000 picked men from Buford's division, will attempt to cut enemies
communication in Middle Tennessee." But the movement of a column of 8,000 men
from Decatur, Ala., southward, which proved to be a feint in favor of Gen.
Sturgis, caused Gen. Lee (May 31st) to order Gen. Forrest to move with "his
disposable force" to help Gen. Roddey in resisting this column. Gen. Forrest
left Tupelo, Miss., June 1st with a picked command of 2,400 men and two
batteries, leaving only a small force in Mississippi. He got as far as
Russellville, Ala., where Gen. Lee stopped him with another order on June 3rd,
to return immediately to Tupelo, Miss., to meet Gen. Sturgis's expedition, which
was marching into Mississippi. Gen. Lee at the same time ordered Gen. Roddey to
reinforce Gen. Forrest in Mississippi, as the column that had started from
Decatur had moved eastward to reinforce Gen. Sherman in Georgia. Gen. Chalmers'
division was still left in Alabama; but later, McCullough's brigade was ordered
back into Mississippi to reinforce Gen. Forrest.
The army of Gen. Sturgis was most carefully organized and equipped, and was
intended to defeat and crush Gen. Forrest, to destroy the railroads south of
Corinth, and to penetrate as far into Mississippi as Columbus and Macon,
returning thence by way of Grenada, Miss., to Memphis. It was made up of a
division of cavalry commanded by Gen. Grierson, composed of two brigades.— one
commanded by Col. Waring (1,500 men), the other by Col. Winslow (1,800 men). The
infantry division under Col. McMillan's command was composed of three brigades,
which were commanded by Col. Wilkins (2,000 men), Col. Hoge (1,600 men), and
Col. Bouton (negro brigade,—1,200 men) in addition to 400 men, who had charge of
22 pieces of artillery. According to these figures the Federal force represented
a total of 8.500 men, equipped and rationed for 20 davs, and accompanied by a
train of 250 wagons. Gen. Sturgis left Lafayette, Tenn., June 2nd, and marched
south of the railroad (M. & O.), via. Salem and Ruckersville, reaching
Ruckersvillc on June 6th. One of his brigades, which was detached, struck the
railroad at Rienza, 10 miles south of Corinth. This indicated that the column
might be going by Corinth to reinforce Gen. Sherman in Georgia. Here Gen.
Sturgis abandoned his plan of moving as far north as the M. & O. railroad, and
moved south to Ripley, Miss., at which point he took the Ripley and Guntown road
in a southeasterly direction, encamping at Ripley on June 7th. He had been
delayed by excessive rains and muddy roads, and reached Stubb's farm, 16 miles
from Ripley, on the night of June 9th. This place was also 9 miles from Brice's
Cross Roads, where the battle was fought. At this point, the road from Baldwin,
Miss., to Pontotoc crossed the Ripley and Guntown road almost at right angles
and made the "Cross Roads." From the "Cross Roads," it was 6 miles to Guntown
and 5 miles to Baldwin each on the M. & O railroad. The country was slightly
undulating and thickly wooded, with little cleared ground.
Gen. Forrest, on receiving the order at Russelville, Ala., promptly retraced his
steps, arriving at Tupelo on the evening of June 5th. He at once began to move
his command into position, awaiting the development of the plans of the enemy.
He learned that the enemy were at Ruckersville on June 6th, and that a brigade
was also at Rienza. He moved Buford's division first to Baldwin and then to
Booneville and ordered Bell's large brigade to Rienza. Rucker was at Booneville
by Gen. Lee's order. At Baldwin on the evening of June 9th, Gen. Forrest learned
for the first time that the enemy had changed his plans, and had abandoned his
northern route and was moving on the Ripley and Guntown road.
With the concurrence of Gen. Lee, he at once issued orders to move his troops
rapidly to the southward, to get in front of Sturgis's command, now that his
plans were more fully developed. He hoped by a rapid movement to reach and pass
Brice's Cross Roads before the Federal army reached that point. Bell was at
Rienza, 25 miles distant, and his artillery was at Booneville, 16 miles to the
north. Rucker was also at Booneville, and Lyon's and Johnson's brigades were at
Baldwin,—Johnson's brigade of Roddey's command having just arrived. The enemy
however was nearer the "Cross Roads" than was expected, having encamped, and
concentrated at Stubbs' farm on the Ripley and Guntown road on the night of the
9th, when Forrest first learned of the change of direction of the Federal
column. But all that rapid marching and movement could accomplish was being
done, and Forrest had his entire force in the vicinity of the "Cross Roads" by I
p. m. next day, at which hour he had all his command up and in action. Forrest's
troops consisted of Bell's brigade (2,787 men), Rucker's brigade (700 men),
Johnson's brigade (500 men), Lyon's brigade (800 men), a total of 4,787 men. He
had two batteries of artillery. Gen. Lee and Gen. Forrest were together in
consultation at Baldwin when a change of plans by the enemy was first known. It
was decided that Forrest should throw his command rapidly in front of Gen.
Sturgis, and if possible, draw him farther towards Okolona before fighting. This
would enable Gen. Lee, the department commander, to get some additional
reinforcements before delivering battle to a force known to be double the
available force under Gen. Forrest. It was not certain that Gen. Forrest could
get in front of Gen. Sturgis before reaching the "Cross Roads." But he believed
he could, and, to expedite matters, the wagon trains were moved southward on the
east side of the M. & O. railroad, so as to leave the road clear for the rapid
movement of the troops. In a letter of Jan. 3ist, 1902, Capt. Sam Donaldson
(Gen. Forrest's aide) says, "I remember full well that this consultation was of
the most pleasant kind, and that the next day much to the surprise of Gen.
Forrest, the commands of Grier son and Sturgis appeared in force, and the great
battle of Tishomingo Creek was fought that afternoon." Gen. Lee, early on the
morning of June 10th, went by rail to Okolona, both he and Gen. Forrest
believing the enemy sufficiently far off to enable all the troops to get by the
"Cross Roads" before the enemy arrived at that point.
At 10 a. m., June 10th, Gen. Forrest telegraphed Gen. Lee at Okolona from
Baldwin (p. 645, Serial No. 78 Rebellion Records) :
"Enemy are advancing directly on this place ; Johnson's brigade is here ;
Buford's division and Rucker's brigade with two batteries will be here by 12
o'clock; our pickets have already commenced firing. N. B. Forrest, Major
General. I have signed this for the general who directed it sent down by the
train. He has moved himself. Chas. W. Anderson, Aide-de-Camp."
The three brigades of Lyon, Rucker, and Johnson were near at hand, while the
largest brigade (Bell's) and the artillery were at considerable distance; all
moving on a road almost parallel with the railroad and nearer to it than the
road by which the enemy were approaching it. Gen. Forrest with that decision,
for which he was remarkable, as he found the enemy across his path, decided to
give battle at once, with the troops he had. Lyon's brigade was in front,
followed by Rucker's and Johnson's, with the other troops moving rapidly up. He
learned the enemy's cavalry was near the "Cross Roads," and would reach that
place before he got there, but his scouts began skirmishing west of the "Cross
Roads." The enemy reached the roads and formed a line of battle, almost a mile
from it on the Baldwin and Guntown roads, having more of a defensive than
aggressive spirit.
Gen. Sturgis had sent back to Memphis about 400 disabled men before reaching
Stubbs' farm, which made his force about 8,100 men. Gen. Grierson, early on the
morning of June loth, at 5.30 a. m., put his cavalry division in motion towards
the "Cross Roads," 9 miles distant. He soon struck Gen. Forrest's scouts,
driving them rapidly before him. On reaching the intersection of the roads, he
sent strong scouting parties towards Baldwin and Guntown. He met the head of
Forrest's column on the Baldwin road, about a mile from the "Cross Roads" about
10 a. m. and at once formed Waring's brigade in line of battle on both sides of
the road and covering it. He also moved up Winslow's brigade and put it on the
right of Waring's, extending to and covering the Guntown road. He reported
meeting the enemy to Gen. Sturgis, who did not start his infantry division till
after 7 o'clock. His trains were still further delayed by the bad roads. The
infantry under urgent requests, was hurried up, but did not arrive on the field
until about 2 o'clock. In the meantime Gen. Grierson became hotly engaged, and
although he fought the Confederates from 10 a. m. until 2 p. m. with variable
success, he was gradually driven back, and his ammunition was almost exhausted,
so that before the head of the infantry arrived on the field, the cavalry was
very nearly defeated. Gen. Grierson asked Gen. Sturgis to permit him to
withdraw, and move his cavalry to the rear to reorganize and replenish his
ammunition as soon as he could be relieved by the infantry. It was so ordered.
The infantry of the Federals arrived almost exhausted. The leading brigade (Hoge's)
was at once formed in the rear of Waring, who had already been pressed back
about 400 yards on the Baldwin road. The second brigade (Wilkin's) arrived
immediately after the first had been put in line, and it was put immediately on
the right of Hoge, relieving Winslow's brigade and covering the Guntown road,
while the 3rd brigade (Bouton's) remained further to the rear to guard the
numerous wagon trains, which had crossed Tishomingo creek. The fighting
slackened a little as the infantry relieved the cavalry, which moved rapidly to
the rear, after having been engaged in hard fighting from 10 a. m. till 2 p. m.,
during which time it had been gradually pressed back by the Confederates. The
artillery, owing to the dense wood, could only be used at times. A battery had
been put on the Baldwin road. The remainder of the artillery was generally
massed near the "Cross Roads" and, as was usual with the Federal Army, the lines
of battle were double. The infantry had scarcely got into position (about 2 p.
m.) before the confederates made a most furious attack from right to left. Two
batteries opened with telling effect on the Baldwin road, the shot falling thick
and fast all about the "Cross Roads," among the artillery and reserves, while
the fire of the small arms of the confederates was most rapid and telling. This
severe fighting continued for over two and a half hours. It was most desperate,
and although the Confederates were several times driven back, they recovered
themselves, and gradually pressed the infantry line back to the "Cross Roads,"
until it gave way in utter confusion, pressing towards the bridge over
Tishomingo creek, but a short distance in the rear of the battle field. To
increase the panic, the Confederates appeared on both flanks about the time the
infantry relieved the cavalry, creating great uneasiness as to the safety of the
trains and the rear of the army, guarded by the negro brigade under Col. Bouton.
Gen. Sturgis and Col. McMillan, who commanded the infantry division, behaved
heroically as did their subordinates, but they could not stem the disaster in
face of the most rapid and persistent fighting of the Confederates all along
their front and flanks. The defeat soon became a rout. The negro brigade was
soon disposed of, and the artillery and trains in inextricable confusion
gradually fell into the hands of the Confederates. All organization was
virtually lost after a vigorous pursuit of a few miles. Unsuccessful attempts
were made to reform the line near the trains about dark, at Dr. Agnew's
plantation, but a disposition on the part of every one to move to the rear
rendered these attempts fruitless. A partial reorganization was attempted at
Ripley, the next morning (11th of June). The Confederates still pressed the
rapid retreat towards the railroad, which stopped at LaFayette. From this place
the expedition had started and at it Gen. Sturgis was met by reinforcements from
Memphis. The expedition was ten days reaching the battle field, but it returned
over the same distance in one day and two-nights. Many stragglers escaped from
the Confederates and, after wandering through the country, reached the M. & C.
railroad several days later.
Gen. Forrest, having decided to engage in battle, displayed great skill in
handling his troops and in hurrying them up. The three brigades near Baldwin
(Lyon's, Rucker's, and Johnson's) numbered 2,000 men, and when dismounted could
number little over i, 600 men. With this force he met the advance of Gen.
Grierson on the Baldwin road about 10 a. m. Lyon's brigade, which was in front,
dismounted and formed into line of battle on both sides of the road. Lyon's
brigade was aggressive or defensive as circumstances indicated, but it was
fighting all the time. Forrest himself led Rucker's brigade as it came up.
Dismounting a part of it, he removed the rest further to the left, and placed it
on Lyon's left, stretching it towards the Guntown road. Having ordered a
regiment sent to the rear of the enemy, north of the road upon which he was
moving early in the morning, he sent his escort company and another company
around on the extreme left (the Federals' extreme right). This disposition of
the troops made the Federals believe he had a larger force than he really had.
He then put Johnson's brigade to the right of Lyon's and on the west side of the
Baldwin road. As has been stated, Bell, with his larger brigade, was hurrying by
a forced march from Rienza (25 miles) and his artillery was rapidly coming up
(16 miles) over the bad roads. They did not arrive, however, until after i
o'clock. In the meantime, Gen. Forrest was savagely fighting with less than
2,000 men the 3,300 cavalry under Gen. Grierson.
The fighting was most severe, and was conducted with varying success for about
three and a half or four hours, and when the infantry of the Federals and Bell
and the artillery, the last of Forest's command, arrived on the field, the
cavalry of Gen. Grierson had been whipped and were clamoring to be relieved.
Waring had already been pressed back by Lyon and Johnson to his second line of
battle, about 400 yards. Gen. Sturgis, having arrived on the field, Winslow
urged to be relieved, and Gen. Grierson earnestly requesting to be allowed to
withdraw his cavalry to be reorganized and re-supplied with ammunition. The
placing of the infantry of the Federals, when the cavalry had been fighting for
nearly four hours, for a short time stemmed the current of disaster. But before
they were entirely in line and the cavalry out of the way (almost in disorder)
Gen. Bell arrived with his large brigade and Major Morton with his two
batteries. It was the critical hour of the battle. Forrest placed two batteries
of artillery on the Baldwin road, and opened a furious cannonade, the effect of
which was soon visible. At the same time Gen. Forrest took Bell's brigade and
carried it to the extreme left of his line. This fresh arrival at once restored
the fortunes of the day in favor of the Confederates, but not without a severe
conflict of over two hours, at which time (4.30 p. m.) the entire Union line was
being gradually pressed back. The enemy began to break badly. A stand was
attempted on a short line near the "Cross Roads," but Forrest gradually pressed
around them, being encouraged by the evident discomfiture of the enemy. The
artillery was pressed forward and fought at close range. At the same time the
regiment to the north and near the rear of the enemy, and the companies to the
rear and south, had created almost a panic. Soon the entire command of the enemy
gave way. The trains and artillery blocked the bridge over Tishomingo creek, so
that the enemy had to wade the stream. Confusion was soon evident everywhere,
and disorder reigned. Forrest then had the bridge over Tishomingo creek cleared
by throwing wagons and dead animals into the stream. He crossed his artillery
and some of his cavalry, and pressed the enemy vigorously. The confusion was
increased and the artillery and wagons of the enemy gradually fell into his
hands ; some of his guns being captured at the "Cross Roads." The others and the
wagons were captured in Hatchie "bottom." He pursued the enemy to Lafayette,
Tenn., from which place they had started on June ist. It was simply a matter of
endurance of men and horses that saved the entire command from being captured.
Forrest had just returned from Alabama and his horses were jaded by the rapid
marching and countermarching before the battle, while the enemy were
comparatively fresh from their slow progress and short marches daily. The
Federals also, when they saw the inevitable, cut out the horses and mules from
the artillery and wagon trains, mounted them and were enabled to get out of the
way more expeditiously than they otherwise could have done. These animals,
numbering near 2,000, added to Grierson's cavalry made about 5,000 men mounted
out of the 8,000 engaged in the battle. When we consider that over 2,000 were
killed or captured and 3,000 stands of arms left on the field, it leaves only
about one thousand who had to make their way back on foot. Many of those who
were mounted were unencumbered by arms.
This battle and victory of Gen. Forrest deservedly gave him a great reputation
and was one of the most complete victories of the war. The fruits of the battle
as shown in Gen. Forrest's address to his men under date of June 28th, 1864,
were 17 guns, 250 wagons, 3,000 stands of arms, and 2,000 prisoners. It is
likely however that the loss in men of the enemy did not exceed 2,168, all told.
Forrest's own loss was 493 men killed and wounded. It may be fairly stated that
taking out the horse holders and guards for the trains, Forrest never had over
3,500 men available in the battle, against 8,100 men of the enemy.
